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Abstract 
The paper studies liquidity management in the banking sector at the zero lower bound imple-
mented by central banks. The new era of monetary policy with interest rates at zero and quantita-
tive easing programs raise questions about the effectiveness of central banking policy and their 
impact on the banking sector. I find that the zero lower bound reduces liquidity reserves of banks 
and thus creates less credit supply. The T-LTRO program, developed by the European Central 
Bank, has helped to tackle this problem. However, the recently expanded asset purchase program 
reveals the opposite effect. Hence, the recent liquidity provisions by central banks have put incen-
tives rather on de-leveraging than bank lending. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the Great Credit Crisis of 2007 to 2009, central banks around the world have cut interest rates to the zero 
lower bound and enforced unconventional monetary policy measures, such as unprecedented open market 
operations and quantitative easing programs. This new era of monetary policy activism creates new challenges 
for the liquidity management in the banking sector. The following paper studies liquidity management in both 
“normal times” and the “Great Credit Crisis” (GCC). 
I develop a model and study the zero lower bound policy of central banks and its impact on the banking sector. 
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The zero lower bound policy is defined as nominal interest rates at or close to zero. This monetary policy stance 
is also labelled highly accommodative or a regime of monetary activism. In this environment both banks and 
households have incentives to invest or hold cash. However, if the environment is linked to a weak economy and 
a confidence crisis, deposits are primarily used for debt repayment, i.e. de-leveraging. Thus, the ultimate goal to 
stabilize the real economy through low interest rates and additional liquidity provisions (i.e. quantitative easing) 
is significantly constrained by its own mean. 
Looking at current global liquidity conditions in financial markets, you find plenty of cheap money all around 
the world. Nevertheless, the bulk of liquidity provisions have not sufficiently stimulated the economy or bank 
lending so far. Most of the central bank liquidity is probably simply used to lower the existing debt burden. 
Hence, targeted liquidity provisions by central banks, such as “Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations” 
(T-LTROs), may help to tackle the current problem during the era of zero lower bound policy or the regime of 
monetary activism. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I give a brief review of the related literature. The 
model is introduced and discussed in Section 3. I prove two lemmata and theorems. Finally, Section 4 concludes 
the main findings. 
2. Literature Review  
The GCC of 2007 to 2009 has demonstrated the importance of the interplay between the financial and real sector. 
There are many unsolved questions in the macroeconomic debate of today. Of course, seminal papers by [1]-[3] 
studied some of these linkages in the macro economy. These papers analyze financial frictions in infinite 
horizon models and make use of log-linear approximations. However, they can only study the effects of 
financial frictions near the steady state due to the equilibrium approximations and they lag the microeconomic 
modeling of liquidity management in the banking sector. This paper attempts to close this gap. 
Despite obvious caveat this literature has been widely used to study the impact of monetary policy [4]-[6]. 
The common findings are as follows: temporary shocks have persistent effects on economic activity and finan- 
cial frictions. In the end, this leads to the amplification of shocks. Consequently, even small financial shocks 
might have huge effects on the real sector. A new line of continuous time macro-models with non-linearities was 
established by [7]. They calibrate the model and show that in times of crisis, equity injection is a superior policy 
compared to interest rate cuts or asset-purchasing programs by the central bank. Due to the fact that the extent 
and length of slumps are stochastic, [7] find a significant increase of the amplification and persistence of adverse 
shocks. In the end, this creates a constellation in which the system is trapped in a recession with low growth and 
a misallocation of resources for some time. This is an important insight for central banks and my paper follows 
this line of research. 
There is some literature about the optimal allocation of bank liquidity. The work by [8]-[10] show two 
important aspects relevant to my paper. First, the limited participation implies that assets offered for sale in the 
market will not attract bids from all possible buyers and thus a lower sale price can be anticipated. As a con- 
sequence, they show that banks can emerge endogenously to solve the liquidity problem generated by limited 
participation. In addition, the contribution by [9] studies directly the liquidity demand by firms. They show 
interesting results related to my findings. But the model shares a fundamental element with [11] that banks 
provide insurance against liquidity shocks which is a restrictive assumption and relaxed in my paper. However, 
the demand for this insurance does not come from the risk aversion of depositors because depositors are risk- 
neutral [9]. 
A further aspect is studied by [12] in the banking literature. They argue that a bilateral bank-borrower 
relationship may be superior to multilateral lending. Similar arguments are modeled along the same lines by [13] 
[14]. Finally, [15] find a new explanation for traditional deposit taking and lending in banking due to economies 
of scales. They argue that the liquidity reserves held by banks can also be used as a buffer against the risk that 
firms draw on their credit lines. Moreover, they show that banks with large amounts of deposits are more likely 
to offer loan commitments. 
Our model sets itself apart from the existing banking literature: Firstly, I setup an optimal allocation and 
liquidity cost function in normal times and under market distress. Secondly, I study this tractable model in 
respect of liquidity management at the zero lower bound. Moreover, I study the effectiveness or ineffectiveness 
of new monetary policy measures in the macroeconomic money supply and demand framework. Finally, I 
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analyze the impact of unconventional monetary policy measures, such as extended liquidity provisions or 
quantitative easing programs. 
3. Model and Discussion  
The model consists of two parts: 1) the microeconomic modeling of expected liquidity demand by banks, and 2) 
the macroeconomic equilibrium of money supply, provided by the central bank, and money demand in the 
banking sector. 
Let me first develop the microeconomic model of expected liquidity demand. I create a standard liquidity cost 
function in banking under fixed costs and open market operations implemented by a central bank. I assume that 
every commercial bank has to hold required or mandatory liquidity/reservers, mR . This assumption is standard 
and does reflect reality in central banking. The mandatory reservers help to guarantee financial and macroe- 
conomic stability. Hence, central banks change mR  over time correspondingly. Moreover, banks hold further 
reservers ( vR ) as a buffer against shocks, according to Basel III regulation or according to their investment 
strategy. These regulatory reservers change over time and must be determined. Of course, the usually expected 
liquidity needs, X, are greater than v mR R+  and the additional money is either obtained by open market 
operations from the central bank or the interbank market. However, both sources of additional liquidity are 
uncertain in quantity, mO , and price, 0i . Consequently, price and quantity and thus X are stochastic variables. 
Figure 1 illustrates the liquidity cost function if 0vR ≥ . Note the assumption of 0vR ≥  is a graphical 
simplification. In the analytical discussion, I differentiate between positive and negative liquidity reserves. 
Furthermore, note that the interest rates vary across different segments of the liquidity cost function due to 
different monetary policy operations, such as central bank lending and borrowing facilities, further refinancing 
operations, or quantitative easing programs. 
Throughout the paper, vi  is the interest rate on the reserve holdings’ due to regulatory requirements and bi  
is the borrowing interest rate via the central bank lending facility. This lending facility is accessible at any time 
and therefore the most expansive source of financing for banks. The amount of open market operations is 
denoted by mO  and the respective interest rate by Oi ; both parameters are stochastic. 
 
 
Figure 1. Liquidity cost function if 0vR ≥ .                                                                         
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In general, the current liquidity demand, X, by banks is a random variable. I assume that X has a standard 
rectangular probability distribution. The probability distribution is represented by 
( ) ( )( )
1
1 ,
2 1
v
v r D Rprob r D X R
r D
− −
 − ≥ > =  −
                           (1) 
where D  defines the maximum amount of deposits, and r denotes the deposit interest rate. Thus, the density  
function with respect to the (random) reserve holding vR  gets ( ) ( )
1
2 1
f X
r D
= −
−
. Getting liquidity from  
central banks or the interbank market is involved with transaction costs. I model the transaction costs by a fixed 
parameter c. According to Figure 1, I obtain for 0vR ≥  the following expected liquidity cost (LC) function: 
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where again mO  denotes the maximum amount of liquidity provided by open market operations at an interest 
rate of Oi . The assumption that all stochastic variables, such as , ,
m
OX O i  are stochastically independent, 
allows me to compute the integrals for mO  and Oi . It turns out, that both integral solutions are the respective 
expected values; i.e. for mO  it is mO    and for Oi  it is [ ]Oi . If 0
vR < , the expected liquidity cost (LC) 
function is represented by 
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      (3) 
The optimal liquidity reserve, vR ∗ , is determined by marginal cost equals to marginal revenue. Hence, first 
let me compute marginal cost by differentiating Equation (2) in respect to vR . In the following, I will limit the 
discussion to the economically meaningful case of 0vR ≥ . I obtain, 
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Secondly, marginal revenues in the banking sector is given by ( )v Ki i− , i.e. the bank deposit rate minus the 
credit interest rate for additional liquidity per unit of bank assets. Equating both expressions determines the 
optimal liquidity needs or liquidity reserves ( vR ∗ ) in case of 0vR ≥ : 
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Solving the last line for vR  returns vR ∗ : 
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where 
( )
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Lemma 1. The optimal reserve holding vR ∗  declines if there is an expansion of expected open market 
operations mO    and/or a reduction in the expected open market interest rate [ ]Oi .  
Proof. The computation of both partial derivatives v mR O∗  ∂ ∂    and [ ]
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Both signs are as expected because the standard borrowing rate (so-called lending facility in central banking) 
is always greater than both the deposit rate (i.e. b vi i> ) and the expected interest rate of open market operations 
(i.e. [ ]b Oi i>  ).                                                                           □ 
Lemma 2. At the zero lower bound, optimal reserve holding vR ∗  is even lower due to 0vi = . An un- 
conventional liquidity provision in this environment, defined as m muO O> , reduces the optimal reserve holdings’ 
further.  
Proof. Using Lemma (1), I demonstrate that at the zero lower bound the negative relationship is even greater  
because the denominator is greater: 
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v
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. For condition two, I obtain:  
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
. In addition, the last term is greater due to m muO O> ; i.e. greater liquidity at the zero  
lower bound.                                                                              □ 
Obviously, during crises the central bank intends to stimulate the economy by lowering the interest rates. 
According to the economic rational banks should use the excess of cheap liquidity to disburse more credit for 
new and productive investments. However, whether banks follow this behaviour depends on several factors, 
such as the banks’ debt levels or the expected economic development. To study this problem in more detail, I 
setup a simple macro-model of money supply and demand in the next subsection. 
Money Supply and Demand: Macroeconomic View 
In this Section, I introduce an aggregate money market model. Money supply is determined by the central bank 
and money demand is determined by banks in the banking and household sector. The microeconomic foundation 
of money demand is already developed above. The households hold deposits in three different forms: 
1) Cash defined as C k D= ∗ , where k is the cash coefficient (percentage);  
2) Short-term saving defined as T t D= ∗ , where t is the short-term coefficient (percentage);  
3) Saving defined as S s D= ∗ , where s is the saving coefficient (percentage).  
Thus, the banks have total equity ( ): 1E D T S t s D= + + = + +  from the households. All banks have to hold 
a mandatory or required minimum reserve ( mR ) at the central bank. This minimum reserve is a certain propor- 
tion, mr , based on total equity E: m mR r E= ∗ . Based on the equity, banks leverage the balance sheet by 
borrowing money according to 0B b E= ∗ . Moreover, banks hold “optimal” reservers 
v vR r E= ∗  in order to 
be in line with regulatory requirements and the internal investment strategy. Thus, for the bank it must hold that 
the use of money is equal to the source of money. This relation is mathematically: 
0 ,
m vR R K E B+ + = +                                     (7) 
where K is the total credit supply to businesses and households. The overall economy has an equilibrium if 
money supply is equal to money demand. This is given by 

supplydemand
.m v sC R R B+ + =

                                     (8) 
Theorem 1. Monetary policy at the zero lower bound increases money supply sB  to ,s oB  due to low rates 
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and unconventional measures (i.e. muO ). Consequently cash holding increases.  
Proof. First, I show that “normal” money supply sB  is smaller than the money supply ,s oB  during crises. 
Substitute Equation (6) in Equation (8) and rearrange it to: 
[ ]( )
( )
,: .b Om v s m s o
b v
i i
C R R B O B
i i
−
 + + = + = −

  
Hence, I obtain an “extended money supply” defined as ,s oB  that is greater than sB . Moreover, if a central 
bank implements unconventional monetary policy measures, i.e. muO  that is greater than 
mO , I obtain an even 
larger extended money supply, , us oB . Secondly, from Lemma (1) and Lemma (2), I know that vR ∗  is lower the 
higher the liquidity provisions by a central bank. Given that mandatory reservers mR  are commonly relatively 
stable and defined by the central bank, I find [cf. Equation (8)] that the cash parameter C must increase to 
compensate the greater money supply.                                                          □ 
Theorem 2. Unconditional monetary policy measures at the zero lower bound are ineffective.  
Proof. Theorem 1 demonstrates that cash holding will increase during a period of interest rates at the zero 
lower bound. This implies due to Equation (7) that for given mR  and credit supply K either equity, E, or 
borrowing, 0B , are lower. But equity does not depend on cash, thus the bank borrowing must decline. Even 
worse, lower borrowing reduces the sources of money for banks. Thus, the additional money from uncon- 
ventional monetary policy measures is mainly hold in cash and used for debt repayment, so-called de-leveraging. 
The unconditional monetary policy measures do not automatically lead to more credit to businesses or house- 
holds. The optimal liquidity management of (private) banks do not support credit supply to the real economy, 
despite the availability of additional liquidity at the zero lower bound.                                 □ 
Therefore, the European Central Bank (ECB) has developed a modified long-term open market operation, a 
so-called “targeted long-term refinancing operation” (T-LTRO). This tool provides cheap liquidity to private 
banks if and only if the money from the central bank is forwarded to businesses and households [16].1 This 
conditionality creates an effective monetary policy measure at the zero lower bound. Hence, the central bank is 
able to circumvent the ineffectiveness of unconditional liquidity provisions (Theorem 2). Nevertheless, the ECB 
provides also unconditional liquidity of 60 bn Euro per month by the new extended asset purchasing program 
(quantitative easing, QE) since March 2015 to end September 2016. In fact, the QE program might be counter- 
productive because of Theorem 2. Moreover, in practise the ECB has put a negative deposit rate of −0.25 
percent in place which mitigates deposit holdings even further. Hence under current conditions, the most effec- 
tive use of cash and additional liquidity is de-leveraging. 
4. Conclusions  
In this paper I have studied the impact of liquidity management in banking under the regime of central bank 
activism, defined as a zero lower bound policy and massive liquidity injections via quantitative easing programs. 
It turns out that those liquidity provisions by central banks, especially unconditional liquidity, are partly 
detrimental to stabilize the economy. 
The economic rational of this proposition is simple: The zero lower bound policy is lowering reserve holding 
in the banking sector. Thus, banks and households have incentives to increase cash holdings. Hence, money on a 
saving account is primarily used for debt repayment, i.e. de-leveraging. Consequently, the ultimate goal to 
stabilize the real economy by interest rates at the zero lower bound or quantitative easing programs has been not 
fully achieved. On the contrary, the model demonstrates that the additional liquidity more likely lowers the debt 
burden than stimualtes the economy. I indirectly confirm that targeted liquidity provisions, such as “Targeted 
Long-Term Refinancing Operations” (T-LTROs) might be more effective in particular during the era of zero 
lower bound policy. Consequently, un-targeted liquidity provisions are more or less ineffective in an era of 
monetary activism. 
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